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At the Liman Colloquium on the Future of Legal Services, practitio-
ners, scholars, and judges frequently urged poverty lawyers to be respon-
sive to the needs of the client-communities they serve.' The need to listen
to how poor communities characterize their legal needs cannot be over-
emphasized, especially in this era of shrinking resources for legal serv-
ices. After all, legal services lawyers decide which cases to accept, and
how much time to spend on them.
3
This Paper will argue, however, that merely listening to clients before
making these allocation decisions is insufficient. It will propose, instead,
that legal services agencies go beyond this community-based approach by
actually sharing the power to distribute legal services with the clients they
serve.
Part I will describe the need to involve poor clients in decisions about
how legal services are allocated. Rationing by lawyers alone is problem-
atic. When deciding which cases to accept, lawyers lack specific informa-
tion about the importance of resolving a legal problem to a particular ap-
plicant. When allocating services between various clients, lawyers are
torn between their duty to individual clients and their responsibility to
serve an entire community. Because lawyers control how their time is al-
located, clients are also subordinated. Unlike private clients, who pay
t J.D., 1998, Yale Law School. This note truly has been a collaborative effort. The author
wishes to thank Professor Dennis Curtis for his supervision. She would also like to thank Susan
Feathers, Julia Greenfield, Alison Iirschel, Pat Kaplan, Jack London, Felix Lopez, Joseph
Luby, Judith Resnik, Bob Sable, and others at the Liman Colloquium for their thoughtful com-
ments. Finally, a special thanks to those practitioners whose "hackles" were raised by the idea
of putting a price on legal services to the poor, for tolerating a law student's critique of their
valuable work.
1. See Raymond Brescia et al., Who's in Charge Anyway?: A Proposal for Community-
Based Legal Service, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (1998) (forthcoming).
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their lawyers money in exchange for representation, poor clients are re-
duced to accepting legal services as charity.4 Their lawyers, because they
provide their services for free, may feel justified in being less responsive
to their clients than private attorneys would.
Part II of this Paper will describe how clients respond to rationing by
lawyers. To encourage their representatives to work harder on their cases
or take the time to listen to them, poor clients may try to pay their law-
yers with "money substitutes": making the lawyer feel important; be-
coming the lawyer's friend; appealing to the lawyer's political beliefs; or
demonstrating commitment to the representation, for example. When
lawyers respond to these "payments," however, their allocation decisions
may be arbitrary, because the client who is most adept at getting her law-
yer's attention may not be the one with the most important case.
Part III of this Paper will propose that inventing better money-
substitutes could solve these problems by creating shadow markets. A
shadow market re-creates market incentives when consumers cannot af-
ford to pay the full price for the services they receive by requiring clients
to bear some part of the cost. Shadow markets would have two main ad-
vantages. First, they could encourage clients to prioritize their legal
needs. If poor people had to pay something for legal representation, they
would have the incentive to decide which of their legal needs merited the
cost of obtaining a lawyer; similarly, they could decide whether costly le-
gal options, such as appeals, were worth pursuing. This prioritizing would
minimize the inter-client conflict that legal services lawyers currently ex-
perience. Second, shadow markets could promote equality in attorney-
client relationships. If poor clients paid something for their representa-
tion, they might feel more entitled to hold their lawyers accountable.
Similarly, lawyers might feel a greater obligation to respond to their cli-
ents' wishes.
I. How RATIONING BY LAWYERS AFFECTS LEGAL SERVICES
DELIVERY
The "angst of poverty law practice"5 is that lawyers are torn between
their obligation to the poor community and their duty to provide zealous
representation to each individual client. This dual role of lawyer and ra-
tioner places poverty lawyers in a very difficult situation. They are asked
to choose who will be clients and what level of services they will receive,
while also providing zealous and loyal representation to each client.
4. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642.6 (1997) (limiting circumstances in which legal services lawyers may
accept reimbursement).
5. See Paul Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1109 (1990).
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These dual obligations to individuals and to the poor community as a
whole are in constant conflict. This Part of the Paper will describe three
ways that lawyer control over rationing creates problems: (A) in choosing
which cases to accept; (B) in allocating resources among current clients;
and (C) in making decisions with clients.
A. Accepting Cases
Legal services attorneys prioritize the legal needs of the communities
they serve and reject cases that do not conform to those standards.6 This
process is called "gatekeeping,, 7 and it is somewhat problematic. Con-
sider the following example:8
Metropolitan Legal Aid (MLA) decided to focus its resources on
ending racial discrimination in public housing. It chose this priority after
consulting with community agencies and after studying housing patterns
in the city. To reform the public housing system, it decided that its law-
yers who practiced housing law would only accept new housing cases
raising racial discrimination issues. Furthermore, clients had to promise
not to accept assignments to segregated projects, as a condition of repre-
sentation.
During an intake meeting, MLA's attorneys discussed an application
from a woman named Ann. She called because her landlord was refusing
to fix her air conditioner. Ann's case, however, was rejected because it
raised no issue of discrimination in public housing.
By prioritizing housing discrimination cases, MLA was trying to
maximize the effect of its limited resources. MLA attorneys discussed
many applications at each weekly intake meeting, but they could only ac-
cept a few of them. Because they functioned as "lawyers of last resort"9
for the poor community, they tried to accept the most important cases.
Rejecting Ann's case is troubling, however. Such decisions have been
criticized, especially by Marshall Breger, as violating the ideal that every-
one should have equal access to the justice system.'0 Breger argued that
legal services lawyers had no right to ration representation."
MLA could respond to this argument by noting that without some
form of rationing, its services would be allocated inefficiently. Because
6. See 42 C.F.R. § 1620.3 (1997) (requiring priorities).
7. See, e.g., Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1110.
8. This example is modified from Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics:
Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 343-44 (1978).
9. Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1138.
10. See generally Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60
N.C. L. REV. 282 (1982).
11. See id.
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MLA lacks the resources to accept every case, a queuing system would
result if lawyers were not allowed to discriminate between applicants
based on the merits of their cases. Also, some applicants seek representa-
tion for cases that are relatively unimportant, such as leaky faucets that
their landlords refuse to fix; others have issues for which there is no legal
remedy, such as being fired solely for being late to work. Providing rep-
resentation in such cases while forcing others to wait would waste scarce
resources. 2 Furthermore, by concentrating its resources on housing dis-
crimination, MLA hopes to cause a systemic change that would help
more people than just its individual clients. Because MLA exists to serve
the poor community, effecting this change may be more important than
protecting the rights of any individual applicant.
If efficiency is to justify rejecting some individuals' cases, then MLA
should strive to create the most efficient gatekeeping system it can.
MLA's system involved attorneys consulting with community leaders.
Both sources of information about a community's needs are important,
but incomplete. Lawyers, for example, have the ability to monitor the law
and set priorities that could push the law in a good direction for the poor
as a whole. This is what MLA tried to do by focusing on racial discrimi-
nation in public housing. Lawyers also have the capacity to judge the le-
gal merits of potential cases; some issues are more easily redressed by the
law than others.
Attorneys cannot satisfactorily set priorities on their own, however,
because they are somewhat removed from the communities they serve:
"The interests of the poor are complex and variegated. To assume the
right to take steps on their behalf is paternalistic. It is not obvious that
middle class lawyers who make these decisions on behalf of poor people
are well qualified to do so."' 3 In part because lawyers tend to be sepa-
rated from their clients by class and race,14 agencies like MLA lack the
ability to measure completely the importance of the various legal needs
of the poor community.
Lawyers also have interests that may keep them from being respon-
sive to changes in a community's legal needs. They have incentives to
keep agency priorities the same, so that they can continue to do work
that they understand and enjoy, rather than taking on new tasks. 5 While
12. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 309 (1988) (arguing that a queuing system
is "too crazy to be fair" because resources are not directed toward the most important cases).
13. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE v. RES.
L. REv. 531 (1994).
14. See generally Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5-21 (1990).
15. See DOUGLAS BESHAROV, An Agenda for Legal Reform, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
POOR: TIME FOR REFORM 5 (Douglas Besharov ed., 1990) [hereinafter, LEGAL SERVICES FOR
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this expertise has benefits, because specialist lawyers could handle more
cases than generalists, it also creates inertia. For gatekeeping to be justi-
fiable, agency priorities would need to be responsive to changes in com-
munity needs.
MLA could assert that its triage system is justified because it consults
with the community activists on its board before setting its priorities, and
that these representatives speak for the needs of individuals like Ann.16
This is more or less the approach recommended by supporters of com-
munity-based lawyering 7 While these community members undoubtedly
bring a useful perspective that helps MLA set its priorities, they would
necessarily lack the diversity of the group of individual clients who call
each week seeking services."
Although a community may be something more than a collection of
individuals, 9 individuals are certainly a part of any community. A truly
"community-based" system, then, would also consider the interests of in-
dividuals like Ann. Individuals experiencing legal problems have special
information about the importance of their needs that lawyers and com-
munity leaders lack; they know how the legal issue is affecting their lives
and how much they want it resolved. An issue that dramatically affects a
client's life may not always fit within an agency's priority system. For in-
stance, imagine that Ann's broken air conditioner case was important to
her because her child was chronically ill and extremely sensitive to heat.
What seemed like a categorically trivial problem, a broken appliance,
could be a health-threatening problem in her case. To maximize effi-
ciency, then, an agency should consider such subjective importance in de-
ciding when to accept a case that might not fit squarely within its priori-
ties.
Of course, just asking an applicant with a legal problem what the pri-
orities of an agency should be would be of little use. Most would be ex-
pected to say that whatever problems they are experiencing should be the
highest priority. Because legal services are free, all an agency like MLA
would really know was that these issues they were worth the effort of ap-
THE POOR] (buttressing this argument with empirical evidence that "[a]bout 80% of the cases
closed in 1987 involved family, housing, income maintenance and consumer/finance matters....
With the exception of family cases, these top four problem areas have remained in just about
constant proportions since 1975.").
16. See Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1146 (stating that community participation in setting pri-
orities is usually achieved by "the use of an advisory board of citizens who care about and are
familiar with the plight of the poor in their community").
17. See Brescia et al., supra note 1.
18. See Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1148 (arguing that lawyers should also consult with indi-
vidual clients in setting priorities).
19. See Thomas M. Meenagan, Community Delineation: Alternative Methods and Problems,
56 Soc. & Soc. Rns. 345 (1972).
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plying for services. Furthermore, asking applicants to tell "sob stories"
about their problems might not reveal all of the people with important
problems, because some people are just better at communicating their
needs than others. If potential applicants knew that they would have to
pay something for representation, however, their willingness to do so
would be a true measure of their commitment to their cases.
B. Post-Acceptance Triage
Scarcity does not end once a an applicant is accepted as a client.
Tremblay named the rationing of legal services among existing clients
"post-acceptance triage." 20 Legal services clients have no reason to limit
the amount of work they demand from their attorneys, because they re-
ceive free services. Economists have labeled the phenomenon of seeking
more of a good when it is free "moral hazard.",2' This label, however, is
somewhat misleading, because seeking more of a free service "is not a re-
sult of moral perfidy, but of rational economic behavior."2 For example,
most people would eat more at an all-you-can-eat buffet than at a restau-
rant where items were individually priced.D This behavior does not make
them bad people, just rational economic actors. For the same reason, ap-
plicants for free representation tend to demand lots of services. Legal
services agencies, on the other hand, work with a fixed budget. For these
reasons, if agencies provided "full service" representation to its clients, a
few clients could consume all of the lawyers' time, forcing the agency to
reject future applicants for services.24 Because legal services are free, law-
yers must limit the amount of representation they provide to each client.
Legal services agencies who engage in "post-acceptance triage," how-
ever, are subject to criticism for infringing ethical rules. The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct require attorneys to represent their clients zeal-
ously and to defer to their clients' wishes on important decisions like
whether to settle a case.2 This zeal may be compromised when attorneys
consider not only whether a legal option would help a client but also
whether the time spent pursuing that option would be better spent on
20. See Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1120.
21. M.V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 217,231 (1968).
22. Id.
23. This example is from Stephen R. Cox, Price Mechanisms and Legal Services, in LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE POOR, supra note 15, at 237.
24. See Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1115.
25. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2 (1995) ("A lawyer shall abide
by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."); id. at Rule 1.3, cmt.
1 ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
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someone else's case.26 Allowing the needs of other clients to adversely af-
fect a representation also implicates conflict of interest rulesY The com-
ment to Model Rule 1.7 states that "[loyalty to a client is... impaired
when a lawyer cannot recommend or carry out an appropriate course of
action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or in-
terests. '' 2
Legal services agencies could try to reconcile their ethical obligations
and their duty as the "lawyers of last resort" by obtaining their clients'
consent to receive only minimally adequate representation. Clients may
waive a conflict of interest by consent after consultation; similarly, clients
may consent to limited representation. Thus, for example, a client could
agree that her legal services lawyer would only try to resolve her problem
through informal negotiations, rather than litigation.
Consent in the legal services context, however, is problematic.3' Un-
like a private client, the legal services client cannot hire another lawyer if
she is unhappy with her representation. No matter how carefully a well-
meaning legal services lawyer asks a client if it would be okay for the
lawyer to provide limited representation, the client may perceive the re-
quest as a "take it or leave it" proposition. Because of her disempow-
ered position, a legal services client may be unable to consent to such
limitations. Furthermore, it may be unethical for the lawyer to accept
the case even if the client consents if the representation would suffer be-
cause of a conflict among all of the lawyer's clients. A lawyer can only
represent a client in such a conflict situation if she "reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected."3 4
26. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 8, at 356-57.
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7(b) (1995) ("A lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to another client ... unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected and (2) the client consents after consultation.").
28. Id. at cmt. 4.
29. See Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1102.
30. See Rule 1.7(b), supra note 27; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule
1.2(c) (1995) ("A lawyer may limit the objectives of representation if the client consents after
representation.").
31. For further discussion of this point, see Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1117-24.
32. See Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529,
1553 (1985).
33. See Jeanne Kettleson, Caseload Control, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 111, 113 (1997)
(noting that consent is problematic in the legal services context and concluding that legal serv-
ices should aspire to provide more than minimal representation); see also Tremblay, supra note
5, at 1122 (acknowledging that lawyer control of resource allocation "leaves the client less pow-
erful than a paying client [and] much of the true sense of informed consent is lost").
34. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, Rule 1.7(b)(1) (1995); see also Bellow &
Kettleson, supra note 8, at 358-59 (making the same argument).
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Because they provide free representation, legal services agencies face
an irreconcilable conflict between the ethical rules and their duty to meet
the legal needs of an entire community. As legal scholar Paul Tremblay
has noted, "The legal services lawyer frequently finds herself in an exis-
tential corner: her professional role calls for allegiance to the individual
above all, but her institutional role demands that she hold back, make
choices and impose limits."35 The need to make triage decisions places le-
gal services lawyers in an impossible situation: they are always conflicted
because they must make value judgments about their clients' cases to de-
cide how to spend their limited time.
C. Lawyer Domination
The dual role of legal services lawyers, as both providers and ration-
ers of legal services, also encourages these lawyers to dominate their cli-
ents." Poor clients are too often overpowered by lawyers who are too
busy to listen to them. According to Ann Southworth's empirical study of
lawyer-client relationships in various practice settings:
Legal services lawyers reported that they played substantial roles in defining
clients' interests and selecting strategies, and that they did so because their
clients had no idea what to do and because clients had few or no alternatives
to the ones their lawyer recommended. In fifteen of the fifty-four matters de-
scribed by legal services lawyers, the lawyers reported that they selected the
strategy without participation by the client or with very little participation. In
thirty of the remaining matters, the lawyers reported that they played a sig-
nificant role in helping clients identify strategies and select among them.3
7
(Recall that the ethical rules require attorneys to consult with clients
about strategies) .
The Southworth study found that legal services lawyers were more
dominating than private attorneys.9 Several legal services attorneys cited
resource constraints as the reason for making strategic decisions them-
selves. 0 Some also explained that the time they could spend describing
41options to clients would be better spent working on other clients' cases.
Because legal services lawyers ration their own services, they tend to
dominate their clients in order to serve more people.
35. Tremblay, supra note 5, at 1109.
36. See id. at 1124 ("The increased powerlessness that inevitably follows from the environ-
ment of scarcity ought to trouble those who object to the disempowerment that poor and de-
pendent people suffer in the modern bureaucratic state.").
37. Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decision-Making in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice:
An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1105 (1996).
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2 (1995).
39. See Southworth, supra note 37, at 1105.
40. See id. at 1136.
41. See id. at 1137-38.
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While such triage may be one incentive for legal services lawyers to
dominate their clients, the fact that legal services clients do not pay for
the services they receive may also play a role. One legal services lawyer
explained that, "[legal services clients] are getting free legal services, and
they're grateful, and they are happy that someone is pursuing their case
for them, and that's sort of it. '42 It is possible that lawyers feel a greater
moral obligation to follow the wishes of paying clients than nonpaying
ones. The Southworth study found that "[1]awyers who were dependent
upon their clients for their salaries generally expressed more deferential
views than did lawyers whose payment came from other sources., 3 In the
study, two civil rights lawyers who usually represented paying clients said
that when they volunteered their services, they felt less need to defer to
their clients' preferences, and more freedom to act "like citizens" and
make decisions themselves." This example reflects a general finding of
the study-that payment affected the amount of control clients exercised
in representation relationships.45 The study did not indicate why this was
true. Perhaps lawyers felt less moral obligation to follow the wishes of
clients who paid nothing for their services. Another possible explanation
is that lawyers providing free representation wanted to be "paid" in the
feeling that they were making the world a better place.
Lawyer domination is almost universally maligned, but proposed so-
lutions urging legal services lawyers to defer more to their clients seem to
have had little effect.46 Maybe the good intentions of poverty lawyers
cannot completely overcome the structural pressures inherent in provid-
ing free representation. This suggests that a solution to the lawyer domi-
nance problem in legal services would need to eliminate rationing by at-
torneys and recreate the kind of moral obligation lawyers feel to paying
clients. Even some form of nominal payment might suffice to instill the
lawyer's sense of obligation to follow the client's wishes.
42. Id. at 1124.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1126.
45. See id. at 1126.
46. See Paul Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering and Street-Level Bu-
reaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 970 (1992) (attributing continuance of regnant lawyering to
psychological and institutional factors: "Writers have been imploring poverty lawyers to pursue
empowerment and collective mobilization for more than twenty years. Yet rebelliousness re-
mains the exception, and not the norm. In my opinion, this is not due to a lack of power or force
in the argument for rebelliousness.").
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II. How POOR CLIENTS USE "MONEY SUBSTITUTES"
The previous Part of this Paper showed that legal services lawyers
and their clients are not colleagues.47 The lawyers possess skills that their
clients need but cannot afford to buy, and exercise a great deal of discre-
tion in deciding how to use those skills on their clients' behalf." A private
client could influence these allocation decisions by paying her attorney
additional fees. Legal services clients, lacking the ability to pay their law-
yers in money, may attempt to increase their control over the representa-
tion by paying their lawyers with "money substitutes." A money substi-
tute is any behavior legal services clients can use to gain more control
over their representation. Money substitutes can take the form of posi-
tive or negative reinforcement. Consider the following example:
Susan had a fourth grade learning-disabled child. The child, Kathy,
had received special education services throughout her schooling, but
was still unable to read or perform simple arithmetic. Kathy had been re-
ceiving one hour of special education services each day in a resource
room, but Susan believed these services were inadequate. Nevertheless,
Susan had agreed at the last annual meeting with the school that the
services should not be increased. She told her legal services lawyer that
she had felt "overwhelmed" by all the experts in the room, and was un-
able to reject their arguments despite her belief that Kathy needed more
help than she was receiving.
The lawyer agreed to try to increase Kathy's services by meeting with
the school officials. The lawyer scheduled another meeting at the school
and negotiated an additional daily hour of one-on-one tutoring for
Kathy. Susan was thrilled. The lawyer attended two other meetings with
the school that year and determined that Kathy was making educational
progress. The school, furthermore, seemed committed to continuing to
provide adequate services for Kathy.
When the lawyer told Susan that she was going to close her file, how-
ever, Susan became upset. Susan feared that the school would try to take
the extra services away if she went to a meeting without an attorney. Su-
san feared that she would be unable to "stand up for herself" at the
meeting if the attorney were not there. Then Susan started crying and
said that Kathy would never learn to read without someone to fight for
her.
47. See, e.g., White, supra note 14 (noting that legal services lawyers often differ from their
clients by class and race).
48. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert G. Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Serv-
ices: Individual Attorney Decisions in Work Priorities, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 237, 244 (1983).
Vol. 17:563, 1998
Shadow Markets for Legal Services
Susan used money substitutes throughout her representation. First,
Susan told the attorney at the first interview that without legal help she
would be unable to obtain the necessary services for Kathy. Later, Susan
again emphasized the dire consequences that would occur if the lawyer
closed the file. As a result, the attorney will feel guilty if she refuses to at-
tend the next school meeting. (And she will feel guilty if she attends, be-
cause of her obligations to other clients). The lawyer accepted the case
with the limited goal of obtaining additional educational services for
Kathy. With that goal accomplished, the attorney could ethically termi-
nate the representation. Susan, however, wanted to expand the goals of
the relationship to include monitoring the continued provision of serv-
ices, and perhaps even teaching her to advocate more effectively for her-
self. The lawyer cannot really know how much Susan needs these addi-
tional services, because the client would not be required to pay for them.
Maybe Susan is acting more helpless than she is, maybe not. In any event,
the attorney cannot close the case without paying an emotional cost.
Legal services lawyers' decisions about how to use their time can be
influenced by many different types of behavior by clients, according to an
empirical study by Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Robert G. Meadow.49
First, clients can pay their attorneys by giving them interesting or impor-
tant cases. A case involving complex or novel issues of law can provide
welcome relief from the monotony of more routine representations. Le-
gal services lawyers spend more time on cases they find interesting, ac-
cording to the study.0 Similarly, a lawyer may spend more time on a high-
stakes case, like preventing an eviction, than a smaller case such as a $500
welfare overpayment.
Another effective client behavior is nagging. As Menkel-Meadow and
Meadow noted:
As the adage suggests, "The squeaky wheel gets the oil." The same is true in
legal services.... Clients who clamor for attention by repeated phone calls or
personal visits place the attorney in a defensive position vis-a-vis the client.
The attorney feels as if he or she must report case progress.s
Nagging can serve a second function as well-demonstrating that a
client values a lawyer's work. Pestering is only one way that clients can
demonstrate this." Clients can also promptly return their attorney's tele-
49. Id. at 251 (confirming "the centrality of client behavior in resource allocation deci-
sions").
50. See id. at 244. Of course, academics speculated that this was the case long before em-
pirical proof existed. See, e.g., Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experi-
ence, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 108 (1977).
51. Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 48, at 242.
52. Many attorneys interviewed in the study indicated that "they preferred clients who were
feisty and actively willing to pursue their cases." Id. at 251.
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phone calls, show up for appointments on time and bring documents at
the lawyer's suggestion.
Another form of payment is a client's appeal to the attorney's politi-
cal beliefs. The Menkel-Meadow and Meadow study found that
"attorney ideology may have an impact on the planning of resource allo-
cation decisions with clients" and that "[i]n their interviews, the attorneys
nearly uniformly revealed strong political activism and consciousness."53
Finally, clients can pay their attorneys in friendship. The study found that
"some attorneys will favor one client over another because of personal
feelings toward their clients." 4
Disempowered people understand the power of such payments, ac-
cording to feminist psychology. Those who lack the ability to achieve
their ends on their own often try to inspire others to want to help them:
"Women 'get what they want' through indirect, covert influencing tech-
niques, often using the assigned sex-role-appropriate behaviors of help-
lessness, dependency, coyness and appeal to emotions."5 Perhaps this
could explain Susan's behavior in the example at the beginning of this
discussion. Susan acted helpless and dependent, and this made it difficult
for her attorney to limit her representation.
When legal services are allocated according to client behavior, rather
than case importance, scarce resources are rationed arbitrarily. The client
who calls every day may not have a more important case than a client
who waits patiently for her attorney to telephone, for example.
III. CREATING SHADOW MARKETS FOR LEGAL SERVICES
So far, this Paper has described how the absence of monetary pay-
ment in legal services affects the lawyer-client relationship. This Part will
describe better money substitutes for legal services, with the goal of in-
venting systems that maximize client autonomy and minimize ethical
problems. It will focus on "shadow markets," systems that mimic market
mechanisms by making clients pay part of the cost of the services they re-
ceive. Section A will describe the comparative advantages of shadow
markets, and Section B will sketch how these systems might be struc-
tured.
53. Id. at 244, 252.
54. Id. at 242.
55. Adrienne J. Smith & Ruth F. Siegel, Feminist Therapy: Redefining Power for the Pow-
erless, in HANDBOOK OF FEMINIST THERAPY: WOMEN'S ISSUES IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 14-15
(Lynne Bravo Rosewater & Lenore E.A. Walker eds., 1985); see also P. Johnson, Women &
Power: Toward a Theory of Effectiveness, 32 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 99, 99 (1976) ("Women have less
access, in reality and in expectations, to concrete resources and competence, leaving them with
indirect, personal and helpless modes of influence.").
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A. The Potential of Shadow Markets
1. Increasing Client Control over Triage Decisions
Part I of this Paper showed that lawyers need to involve clients more
in the gatekeeping process. It also discussed how lawyers could not ethi-
cally provide limited services to poor clients. This Part will describe how
shadow markets could solve both problems, by empowering poor clients
to triage their own cases to some extent.
To make the gatekeeping process more efficient, shadow markets
would enable legal services agencies to use information from lawyers,
community leaders, and individual clients to decide which cases to accept.
When taking applications for services, agencies could explain the costs of
representation to clients. Some clients would decide that solving their
problem was not worth the cost. Those who valued the representation
more highly would still request services. The agency could then choose
among these remaining applicants according to its priority system
(developed in consultation with community leaders).56 In effect, the first
round of triage would be performed by applicants themselves, according
to their personal priorities. This process would integrate the special
knowledge of clients, community leaders and lawyers. As discussed pre-
viously, 57 lawyers know how to evaluate the legal merits of cases and to
strategize about how to make "good law"; community leaders are able to
assess the needs of the community as a whole; and individuals understand
how important resolving their particular case is to them. By using all
three sources of information, legal services agencies could accept merito-
rious cases that are important to individual clients and their communities.
Shadow markets could also eliminate the need for post-acceptance
triage by eliminating the "moral hazard" problem. If clients paid some-
thing for representation, they would have an incentive to limit their de-
mand for costly legal options, such as appeals. To ensure that clients
could make informed choices, however, attorneys would need to spend
time explaining the costs and benefits of various legal alternatives.
Of course, these advantages assume that legal services clients are ca-
pable of accurately assessing the importance of their legal needs to them.
56. Empirical research indicates that charging a small fee would reduce, but not eliminate,
the need for lawyers to ration services. The RAND Health experiment found that charging a
$100 deductible and 25% copayment reduced consumption of medical care by 40%. See JOSEPH
P. NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 243 (1993). Many legal services agencies reject a far
higher percentage of applicants. See Willam P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the
Poor in Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. REV. 273, 282 (finding that Northwest Legal Services in Shreve-
port rejects 84% of applicants).
57. See supra Part I.A.
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In theory, shadow markets should encourage clients to prioritize their le-
gal needs: "Because the clients must incur some out-of-pocket cost, they
are encouraged to set priorities among their needs. Thus, scarce re-
sources are directed to the services that recipients consider most impor-
tant."' This outcome is called "allocative efficiency."59 Economists have
extensively debated the use of shadow markets in medical care, and some
believe that cost-sharing maximizes allocative efficiency.: ° The idea is that
deductibles and copayments inspire consumers to think twice about
whether they really need a professional's services."
Not all scholars believe that shadow markets will function this effec-
tively, however. Some argue that legal services clients lack the informa-
tion or the capacity to prioritize their legal needs,62 and that lawyers
would do a better job of defining priorities for legal services.63 For this
reason, some have argued that professionals, rather than consumers,
should make allocative decisions." This argument is particularly strong
when applied to clients whose decisionmaking capacity may be impaired,
such as battered women or mentally ill cients.6 Any shadow market sys-
tem should exempt applicants for services who are unable to assess the
importance of their problems in a meaningful way.
Despite these potential problems, shadow markets can encourage
most consumers to seek services when (and only when) they need them,
according to the RAND Health Experiment. This was a large, publicly
funded study of the effects of various copayments and deductibles on
health care consumption.6' It found that cost-sharing reduced consump-
tion of health care services dramatically with no significant adverse im-
pact on participants health compared to those receiving free care.6 By
58. Besharov, supra note 15, at xvi.
59. Stephen R. Cox, Price Mechanisms and Legal Services, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
POOR, supra note 15, at 236-37 (defining allocative efficiency).
60. For a discussion of the debate among medical economists, see T.R. Marmot et al.,
Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1981).
61. See Marion Ein Lewin, Cost Sharing for Medical Services Through Medicaid, in LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE POOR, supra note 15, at 190 (arguing that cost-sharing "reduces unnecessary
utilization" of health services). See also Marmot, Boyer & Greenberg, supra note 60, at 1006
(presenting this idea only to question it later).
62. See De Miller, Copayments, Vouchers and Judicare, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
POOR, supra note 15, at 204 ("The specter of dissipating scarce resources on less significant mat-
ters is simply to real and too disturbing [to be accepted by Congress].").
63. See id. at 203.
64. See id. at 204.
65. This point was suggested to me by Alison Hirschel, who works with elderly clients at the
Michigan Protection and Advocacy agency.
66. See generally, William P. Brandon, A Large-Scale Social Science Experiment in Health
Finance: Findings, Significance and Value, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1051 (1995).
67. See NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, supra note 56, at 82 (finding
a reduction in expenditures); id. at 201 ("no substantial benefits from free care").
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analogy, one would expect cost-sharing for legal services to reduce client
demand for services, without adversely affecting their "legal health," be-
cause the clients would prioritize their legal needs. In fact, a legal clinic in
Chicago that charges reduced fees to low income clients found that their
clients were "more likely to approach an attorney with only meritorious
cases," and "more likely to be judicious in the use of attorney time when
that time is being charged." '
2. Creating Symbolic Equality Between Lawyers and Their Clients
Regardless of the effect of shadow markets on client demand, the
symbolic value of clients paying something for legal services could reduce
lawyer domination of clients.69 Free legal services create inequality on the
symbolic level, as Edgar S. Cahn has noted:
When legal services programs provide assistance to indigent clients without
charging for these services, we are unwittingly transmitting a message:
"Nothing you have and nothing you can provide is of any value to me, the
poverty lawyer." That is not only patronizing; it is wrong and it is self-
defeating. It is a strategy more likely to generate frustration and a sense of
powerlessness than progress. Helping the poor with legal representation will
not work if it does not enable our clients to produce and to contribute. If we
are to be true to our commitment to the client community, we must under-
stand that we need them as much as they need us.70
If poor clients paid their lawyers something, they could symbolically
recreate the equality between lawyers and private clients and simultane-
ously assert their self-worth, "changing 'the relationship between lawyer
and client, from one of dependency and implicit subordination, to one of
reciprocity and mutuality."' 71 Even empirical research demonstrates that
payment by clients makes lawyers feel more obligated to treat them as
equals.7
Most legal services lawyers, who entered their profession out of a
deep-rooted desire to help the poor,73 probably aspire to better relation-
68. CHICAGO LEGAL CLINIC, INC., FEE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHICAGO LEGAL CLINIC,
INC. (1997) (on file with author). The Chicago Legal Clinic, Inc., charges reduced fees averag-
ing between $40 to $60 per hour to clients whose incomes are too high to qualify for free legal
services. See Interview with Edward Grossman (Apr. 3, 1998) (on file with author).
69. See supra Section I.C and Part II.
70. Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2133,2144 (1994).
71. Alan Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor-A Commentary, 1669
GEo. L.J. 1669, 1706 (1995) (quoting Calm, supra note 70, at 2151).
72. See Southworth, supra note 37, at 1148 ("This research lends modest support to the
view that giving clients financial control over their relationships with lawyers ... might help im-
prove lawyers' accountability to clients."); see also ILLINOIS LEGAL NEEDS STUDY, supra note
2, at 60 (finding higher percentage of poor clients who contacted private attorneys were satisfied
with their representation than those who contacted legal services lawyers).
73. See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 48, at 81 ("In their interviews, the [legal
services] attorneys nearly uniformly revealed strong political activism and consciousness.").
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ships with their clients. Ideally, lawyers for the poor would help poor
communities solve their own problems, be open to non-legal solutions to
problems, be client-centered and client-driven and provide high quality
representation efficiently.74 Legal services lawyers would work with their
clients to amplify their voices75 and form problem-solving partnerships.76
In a partnership, the benefits and burdens of cooperation are borne by
both participants. This equality could be symbolically recreated if clients
paid something for the benefits they received from their attorneys. In
fact, the Chicago Legal Clinic noted that when a low-income client pays
fees, he or she "retains his/her dignity and freedom from dependence on
charity [and] has a greater sense of investment in his/her case."n
B. Creating Better Money Substitutes
The previous Section discussed the advantages of "charging clients
something" in the abstract. This Section will describe what kind of pay-
ments could be used in a shadow market system. Because shadow market
systems must be responsive to the needs of each agency's community of
clients, this part will also describe how a hypothetical legal services
agency, Metropolitan Legal Aid (MLA), might customize a shadow mar-
ket to fit its particular situation.
A legal services agency would have great flexibility in designing a
shadow markets program, assuming it received LSC's permission to do
so.78 To encourage clients to prioritize their legal needs, the agency
should ensure:
(1) that individual service prices be charged; (2) that those prices reflect in a
relative sense the resource costs of the services rendered; (3) that the service
prices charged each client vary with his ability to pay; and (4) that in every
situation the price charged be of sufficient magnitude to induce the client to
evaluate at the margins the value and cost to him of the service required to
solve his legal problem.
79
These features link a client's desire for legal services (ability and
willingness to pay) with the cost of the representation to the agency. Any
of several structures can meet these criteria.
First, cost-sharing systems can be structured by charging clients a por-
tion of the cost of their representation on a sliding-fee basis. This design
74. See Houseman, supra note 71, at 1705-06.
75. See Cahn, supra note 70, at 2144-45.
76. See Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and
Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 34 (1984).
77. CHICAGO LEGAL CLINIC, INC., supra note 68.
78. See 45 C.F.R. § 1642.6 (1997) (limiting the circumstances in which an agency receiving
LSC funds can accept reimbursement from clients).
79. Cox, supra note 23, at 239.
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is used by legal services systems in England, Sweden, Norway and Fin-
land.60 Sweden's system, for example, charges clients a deductible and
capped copayment that varies with income."' Because even a modest de-
ductible and copayment can have a marked effect on services, 2 these
prices should be kept relatively low, in relation to applicants' income.
Cost-sharing systems have drawbacks, though. One administrative
difficulty is how to measure clients' income. This problem may not be fa-
tal, however, because legal services agencies already gather financial in-
formation about clients to determine their eligibility. A more serious
difficulty would be determining the amount that poor clients could afford
to pay.8 One opponent of cost-sharing has argued that legal services cli-
ents could not afford any payments at all: "There is no awareness of the
impossibility of most legal services clients affording even a nominal $5 or
$10 amount, especially when they are asked to subsist on welfare grants
pitched at only 50 to 70% of the national OMB poverty line, itself an in-
adequate amount."''
A second way of creating a shadow market is a voucher system. A
voucher system avoids the problems of a cost-sharing system, but has
some disadvantages of its own. Rather than charging clients money, legal
services agencies could distribute vouchers to poor people that could be
redeemed for a certain number of hours of legal services from the
agency."6 To determine the number of attorney-hours available for each
voucher, the agency could measure how many attorney-hours it could
provide and divide that amount by the estimated number of poor people
in its service area. Each poor person in the service area would be entitled
to one voucher. To create a shadow market, vouchers could be traded or
80. However, these systems differ from the copayment structure proposed here because
they use private attorneys to provide legal services to the poor rather than staffed office pro-
grams and the poorest clients usually receive free services. See Russell Waltman, Legal Services
in England, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR, supra note 15, at 194-95 (England); Jon T.
Johnson, Nordic Legal Aid, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 301, 313-16 (1994) (Sweden,
Norway, and Finland).
81. Johnson, supra note 80, at 313.
82. See NEWHOusE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, supra note 67, at 82.
83. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.5 (1997) (describing how LSC recipient agencies determine finan-
cial eligibility for services).
84. See Douglas J. Besharov, Client Priority Setting, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR,
supra note 15, at 23 (noting that after extensive searching, he was unable to find information
about the financial status of legal services clients).
85. Miller, supra note 62, at 202.
86. Some scholars have advocated voucher plans allowing poor clients to purchase services
from private attorneys. See Cramton, supra note 13, at 591. This note does not advocate that
option because a Legal Services Corporation study found that private attorney vouchers were
poor mechanisms for delivering legal services. Clients did not know any private lawyers and did
not bargain with them for better services. Staffed office programs were much more efficient. See
THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES iii (1980).
Yale Law & Policy Review
sold by poor people to those who require additional legal services. They
could also save vouchers for future use. Thus, the vouchers would be-
come like cash, and would have value to voucher holders. s
Administering a voucher system would impose costs on the agency-
from printing the vouchers, to estimating the number and value of them.
Distributing the vouchers to the poverty community could also be prob-
lematic." Also, a client with a severe legal problem might run out of
vouchers, even after buying or borrowing them from others. One solution
might be to allow such a client to purchase additional vouchers from the
agency, but this brings back all the problems of monetary payments.
A third kind of shadow market could be created using "Time Dol-
lars."8' 9 Time Dollars create a shadow market by allowing poor people to
purchase legal services vouchers by donating their services in their com-
munities. For example, a client who worked for ten hours at a homeless
shelter might receive a voucher for ten hours of legal services. Actually
setting up a Time Dollar system would require the active involvement of
several other agencies, however.90
After examining each of these structures, the hypothetical legal serv-
ices agency, MLA, should combine cost-sharing and non-monetary sys-
tems in a way that would best suit the needs of its potential clients. Sup-
pose that after consulting with community groups and current clients,
MLA found that many of its clients could not afford a cash payment. It
might then choose a modified Time Dollars program with a cost-sharing
option.91
If MLA liked the idea of a Time Dollars program, but did not want to
invest the resources to set up the network of volunteer organizations that
Cahn envisioned working together, it could allow clients to pay for repre-
sentation in time working for the legal services agency. ILA would need
87. For a fuller description of shadow markets in vouchers, see Ronald H. Silverman, Con-
ceiving a Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HoFsTRA L. REv. 885, 1102-09 (1991) (applying
voucher-market concept to judicare model of private attorneys representing poor people).
88. Silverman suggested distributing vouchers to those who actually apply for legal assis-
tance, id., but this solution would impair trading in vouchers, because everyone who had a
voucher would also want to use it. Another possibility would be to allow people to apply for
vouchers at places like welfare agencies, churches and soup kitchens. In either case, getting
vouchers to all eligible people would be difficult.
89. The concept of "Time Dollars" was invented by Edgar S. Calm, the director of Time
Dollar, Inc. This note's discussion of Time Dollars is based on his article, Reinventing Poverty
Law, supra note 70.
90. I am indebted to Jack Londen of Morrison & Foerster for this point. He has stated that
legal services agencies in California are interested in the Time Dollars concept, but that they
are waiting for other agencies to join in a group effort to set up such a system. Interview with
Jack Londen, Attorney, Morrison and Foerster (Mar. 11, 1998).
91. Calm, for example, proposed combining a Time Dollars program with a cost-sharing
program, so that clients who required a large amount of legal services would have the option of
paying in time or money. See Calm supra note 70, at 2151-52.
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to carefully consider what time-price would encourage clients to priori-
tize their legal needs without imposing an undue hardship on them. Re-
call that studies on shadow markets in health care found that relatively
low prices were effective in encouraging clients to prioritize their needs.
9
2
Suppose that MLA decided to preliminarily set this price at one hour of
client work for every five hours of representation. It would next need to
find ways to use its clients' services. First, clients could spend time work-
ing on their own cases: gathering documents, calling agencies, keeping
journals, etc. This would also have the advantage of teaching clients how
to be more effective advocates for themselves. Second, clients could work
additional hours, if necessary, performing services like fund-raising and
outreach for the agency. To use all of this new volunteer time, MLA
could set up a "telephone bank" in one of its offices, for example, where
clients could make fund-raising calls.
For clients who were unable or unwilling to spend time working for
the agency, MLA could offer a cost-sharing option. MLA would want to
make its fee scale comparable to the cost of the payment-in-kind system.
Suppose that it estimated that a payment of .075% of annual income was
the equivalent of one hour of work. It could then charge this amount for
every five hours of work. For example, a client with an annual income of
$8,000 would pay $6 for every five hours of attorney-time. Of course,
these charges would need to be adjusted for family size. To ensure that
clients with time-consuming cases were not oppressed by the size of these
payments, MLA might also want to cap the payments at 3 percent of an-
nual income (or 40 volunteer hours in the payment-in-kind system).
MLA would also want to be flexible in using its shadow market sys-
tem. For emergency cases, such as evictions, clients should not be re-
quired to pay "up front." Clients should also be offered payment plans,
whether they paid in cash or work. Also, MLA might want to make ex-
ceptions in various cases. For example, it could decide to waive the fee
for a client with an "impact" case that could benefit the entire commu-
nity. It would also, of course, want to exempt clients who were incapable
of prioritizing their needs because of some form of mental disability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Shadow markets have the potential to involve individual community
members in selecting cases for services and to give clients control over
the level of representation they receive. Client payments could also sym-
bolically promote equality between lawyers and clients.
92 See NEvHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, supra note 67, at 82.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Further study of shadow markets is warranted. Pilot programs would
be particularly interesting. The Legal Services Corporation has stated
that "[t]he Corporation, legal services programs, clients and the legal pro-
fession should concentrate... on finding and developing creative local
delivery systems."' Experiments with cost-sharing programs would also
be helpful in determining whether the foreseen benefits outweigh the
administrative costs.94 These benefits should be compared with other
mechanisms that encourage clients to prioritize their legal needs, such as
client education.95 More information about the income of legal services
clients would be useful to determine the benefits of cost-sharing in com-
parison with voucher programs.
In this era of shrinking budgets for legal services programs, shadow
markets provide a way to do more with less. Including individual appli-
cants in the process of selecting clients for services would increase effi-
ciency. Also, ending post-acceptance triage and accepting client pay-
ments would reduce the problem of lawyers dominating their clients. This
potential improvement is worth a try.
93. THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY, supra note 86, at iii.
94. The Legal Services Corporation has experimented with several delivery systems other
than shadow markets in the past. See id.
95. See Lewin, supra note 61, at 193 (suggesting that administrative costs of cost-sharing be
considered in the Medicaid context).
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